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The immediate aftermath of the election saw the construction of much teleo-
logical argument based on the inevitability of the Conservatives’ win. Much
of this assertion appeared starkly at odds with the verities of a ‘neck-and-neck’
race we were supposedly witnessing throughout the campaign. The failure of the
vast majority of journalists, pollsters and academics to predict a Conservative
overall majority was perhaps understandable.1 Even the imported strategists
assisting the Conservatives, Lynton Crosby and Jim Messina, were privately
predicting the Conservatives would fall just short of a majority, believing that
a 312 – 319 range was probable.2 What was less excusable was the belief of
many academics and pollsters that Labour would win more seats than the
Conservatives, given the importance of economic competence and leadership
in contemporary elections.3
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1There was the occasional notable exception. The commentator Matthew Parris, for example, declared
that ‘The Tories are going to win—and win well’, The Times, 21 March 2015. Even he retreated from this
bold position during the campaign, however, and by its conclusion was talking of the Conservatives only
winning circa 290 seats.
2 The Times, ‘Tories knew they would win three weeks before the vote’, 13 May 2015.
3The mean seat prediction of political scientists (not the two editors . . . ) in the Political Studies
Association’s survey was for the Conservatives to win only 277.3, compared with 282.3 for
Labour. Pollsters predicted 283.7–284.6, respectively, while journalists at least had the Conservatives
as the largest party, at 285.7 to seats to Labour’s 281.5. See https://twitter.com/PolStudiesAssoc/status/
596599887208292352?utm_source=fb&fb_ref=Default&utm_content=596599887208292352&utm_
campaign=PolStudiesAssoc&utm_medium=fb.
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1. Why did the Conservatives win?
There is no need to over-complicate explanations. The Conservative election
victory in 2015, the first case since 1955 of a government increasing its vote share
after more than two years in office, was due to two principal factors; greater eco-
nomic trust invested in the party compared with Labour and, in David Cameron,
possession of a leader seen as far more Prime Ministerial than his Labour counterpart.
Given that no party has ever overcome rating deficits (and they were large ones) on
both these issues to form a government, the result ought to have been less of a surprise
than the (embarrassingly off-beam) polls suggested. Many commentators did expect
the Conservatives to at least be the largest party, a triumph abetted (but not created)
by the SNP’s demolition of Labour.
The Conservative campaign focus stuck resolutely to its core messages of
‘economic competence and strong leadership’.4 The clue was, after all, in the title
of the party manifesto: Strong Leadership; A Clear Economic Plan; A Brighter,
More Secure Future.5 There was none of the vagueness of ‘invitations to join the gov-
ernment of Britain’ that lay in the hazy ‘Big Society’ civic responsibility appeals
of 2010. The Conservatives’ 2015 economic message was relatively simple, but
had been effectively and endlessly repeated over the previous five years with the
Liberal Democrats in chorus. ‘The ‘other lot’ messed up the economy, ‘failed to
fix the roof while the sun was shining’ and the Conservatives ‘have fixed it for
you. Let us continue the job’. Labour was required to make the argument that it
was ‘time for change’ and failed to do so. In vainly attempting to counter the
economic narrative, Labour could highlight the regularity of George Osborne’s
missed deficit reduction targets. The Chancellor’s own forecast suggested only a
modest reduction of debt (high under successive governments of different political
hues, but lower than the G7 average when Labour left office in 2010) from 80 to
70% of GDP, over the next Parliament. Interest payments would remain huge.
Yet, as Andrew Gamble has indicated, perceptions are often more important
than reality. Many electors were indeed unconvinced that the previous Labour Gov-
ernment was responsible for the crash—but polls suggested that the largest single
category of electors did blame the ‘debts Labour racked up’.6
The leadership message was equally uncomplicated, presenting David Cameron
as the only credible Prime Minister. Amid the focus on the economy and the rival
4http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/general-election-2015/11608589/Lynton-Crosby-the-so-called-
experts-have-lost-touch-with-ordinary-people.html, 15 May 2015.
5Conservative Party (2015) ‘Strong Leadership: A Clear Economic Plan: A Brighter, More Secure Future’,
Election manifesto 2015, accessed at https://s3-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/manifesto2015/Conservative
Manifesto2015.pdf.
6See, for example, http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2011/nov/21/gloomy-britons-blame-labour-
poll, 21 November 2011.
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leaders, other Conservative policies, such as 500 more ‘free schools’, 30 hours of free
childcare and the sale of social housing, were not discussed to anything like the
extent of the economy. The same could be said of several Labour policies. While
the ‘mansion tax’ was sometimes dissected, other offerings, such the party’s own
(25 hours) free childcare promise; a lowering of the voting age to 16; abolition of
the ‘bedroom tax’ and a reduction in university tuition fees, did not perhaps
receive the critical analysis they merited.
The rise of the SNP presented the Conservatives with a chance to reinforce core
themes. The campaign was marked by inexorable pleas to electors to avoid the
‘coalition of chaos’ of aweak Labour Prime Minister reliant upon a needy, profligate
SNP. No matter that the dire leftist threat posed by Sturgeon and Salmond to Sun
readers in England was presented positively as Scotland’s opportunity by the same
paper north of the border. Both portrayals were of course functional for the Con-
servatives. David Cameron spent the final few days of the campaign attempting
to convince voters that a Conservative majority was necessary and attainable
to avoid this scenario. In bullish performances buoyed by internal polling,
Cameron stressed that his party was ‘just a few seats short’, while steadfastly refusing
to answer questions on what a majority Conservative Government might do to the
welfare budget in order to satisfy the identified £12 billion of savings required from
public expenditure.7
The Conservative targeting of Liberal Democrat seats was ruthlessly effective,
whilst John Curtice has shown how well the Conservatives defended narrow major-
ities over Labour. In this respect, as Justin Fisher has demonstrated, the Conserva-
tives had a considerable financial advantage in campaign expenditure. This
spending was used fruitfully to mount a combination of nationally promoted mes-
sages and sophisticated local operations, including the deployment of 100 paid
campaign organisers in target seats and the effective use of social media. The con-
sequences were dramatic as the Liberal Democrats performed far worse than even
most of the (already dire) forecasts had indicated.
As the contributions from Tim Bale and Paul Webb and by David Cutts and
Andrew Russell have highlighted, the ‘black widow effect’ of the Conservatives,
having lured the (acquiescent) Liberal Democrats into government, was all too
apparent, as erstwhile coalition partners were largely destroyed. Guilty of naivety
in entering government in 2010 without securing at least a university tuition fees
freeze to justify the manifesto grandstanding, the Liberal Democrat leader largely
7Perhaps, the clearest example of this bullish approach was Cameron’s appearance on BBC Breakfast on
2 May. He repeatedly insisted that a Conservative majority was attainable and, apart from rejecting cuts
to child benefit, refused to answer any questions from the interviewer, Charlie Steyt, about where cuts
would fall. On exiting the studio, Cameron confirmed the deliberateness of this strategy.
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ignored his senior Commons team in negotiations with the Conservatives.8 Cameron
needed Clegg far more than Clegg needed Cameron in 2010 and a better bargain was
possible. That Clegg was subject to so little internal challenge was surprising, a
botched attempted coup in 2014 soon petering out. Liberal Democrat achievements
in office—much of the thrust for the raising of tax thresholds for the low-paid came
from that direction—were ignored by an electorate which remembered only the
broken tuition fees promise and, possibly, the folly of the Alternative Vote referen-
dum. In 2015, the Liberal Democrats’ capacity for gullibility stretched to new
levels in their belief that a modest incumbency effect could halt a tidal wave.
2. Labour’s failings
It is tempting to compare Labour’s loss with that in the 1992 election, when the
party had significant hopes of office, but lost as a consequence of a lack of economic
trust in the party9 and an unelectable leader. As in 1992, the party led on the ‘altru-
istic’ issues, notably the NHS, but trailed on the economy—and there is a clear issue
hierarchy. Ed Miliband’s alleged threat, prior to the 2015 election, to ‘weaponise’
the NHS, was always unlikely to shape the outcome, given Labour always leads
on the subject. It was also one of the few areas largely protected from expenditure
cuts by the Conservative–Liberal Democrat coalition and, amid a brief phase of
political cross-dressing, received an (uncosted) extra funding campaign pledge of
£8 billion extra per year from the Conservatives.
What Labour had to do instead was ‘de-weaponise’ the economy as an issue, yet
pleading, howeverobjectively valid, that the recovery was not ‘one for all’ was not tan-
tamount to a clear and sustainable alternative economic strategy. The third big policy
issue of the election, accompanying the economy and the NHS, was immigration, but
this was, as James Dennison and Matthew Goodwin have shown, infertile territory
for both of the main parties, neither of whom the electorate trusted on the subject.
UKIP’s 3.9 million votes provide ample testimony to the salience of immigration
as an issue and demonstrated contempt for the main parties in their handling of
the subject. The Conservatives and Labour talked tough on immigration in full
knowledge of their lack of control over EUarrivals under current law and a significant
section of the electorate remained unimpressed. UKIP harmed the Conservatives and
Labour, but it is credible to contend that Labour was hurt more.10
8See David Steel, ‘Six ways Nick Clegg steered the Lib Democrats to disaster’, The Guardian, accessed at
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/may/11/nick-clegg-liberal-democrats-disaster-
coalition, on 12 May 2015.
9Sanders, D. (1993) ‘Forecasting the 1992 British General Election outcome: The performance of an
‘economic’ model, British Elections and Parties Yearbook, 3.1, 110–115.
10For the most authoritative arguments on the basis of UKIP support, see the debate in Parliamentary
Affairs, online, 17 April 2015, Evans, G. and Mellon, J. ‘Working Class Votes and Conservative Losses:
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As David Denver’s review of the polling evidence indicates, Ed Miliband never
appeared a wise choice of leader, trailing Cameron on ‘best Prime Minister’ by a
very wide margin from the moment he became Labour leader and never threatening
to overcome the deficit. The plea in mitigation was that the 2010 leadership contest
may not have contained anyone capable of delivering a Labour victory, but that is
necessarily speculative.11 The prospects for Labour ought to have been brighter in
2015 than 1992, when the party struggled to overcome the legacy of its hugely un-
popular set of 1980s policies. Labour had at least been popular in office for a decade
from 1997; it was not inevitable that the final grim years would eclipse fonder mem-
ories of Labour in office.
Yet as Steven Fielding has charted, Miliband’s Labour thrashed around, launch-
ing three-month wonder ideas: ‘pre-distribution’; ‘squeezed middle’; ‘one nation
Britain’; ‘predators versus producers’ and short-term retail offers, such as a freeze
on energy prices. The sum of the parts was never a coherent strategy, although
the party was always going to struggle once economic recovery began. Astonishing-
ly, Miliband forgot to mention the deficit at his party’s final annual conference
before the election, let alone deal with the issue. Labour’s 83-page election mani-
festo was launched with a solemn emphasis upon the need for fiscal responsibility.
Yet Miliband issued a flat denial when asked, at the final television showpiece event
of the campaign, the BBC’s Question Time, whether the previous Labour Govern-
ment had overspent. Other answers were available: either agreement that Labour
was not prudent ‘in some areas’, or, if feeling obliged to defend the record, the
obvious retort was to turn the question to ask the interrogator which Sure Start
centre or NHS wards he would like to nominate for closure, given the premise
of the question? The importance of Miliband’s unsatisfactory response can be
overstated: viewing figures were modest. Nonetheless, his responses represented
another example of incoherence.
Not that having a different leader in Scotland helped Labour. Ironically, Labour
had enjoyed a good 2010 election here, with a swing to Gordon Brown’s party. James
Mitchell has indicated that the party’s choice of Jim Murphy as Scottish Labour
leader allowed the SNP to outflank Labour to the left and present itself as the anti-
austerity party. The SNP would stand up for Scotland against the ‘Red Tories’ of
Labour. A different choice of Scottish leader might have helped at the margins
and it was a mistake to assume that Murphy’s high-visibility referendum campaign
Solving the UKIP Puzzle’; Ford, R. and Goodwin, M. J. ‘Different Class? UKIP’s Social Base and Political
Impact: A Reply to Evans and Mellon’; ‘Class, Electoral Geography and the Future of UKIP: Labour’s
Secret Weapon?’
11For a convincing rebuttal (from a non-left-wing perspective) of the idea that David Miliband
represented a ‘prince across the water’, see Jenni Russell in_The Times_, ‘Labour mustn’t fall for the
myth of David’, 11 June 2015.
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successes would transfer into a very different form of contest. Yet, the Scottish
Labour talent pool did not appear exceptionally deep. An organisational restructur-
ing of Scottish Labour, allowing it much greater autonomy to offer a tailored Scot-
tish message under a federal system, would have taken place much too close to the
election to convince and the Scottish party would still have needed a distinctive
leader.
3. Onwards to 2020
John Curtice has indicated how winning a majority in our fragmented party system
is much more difficult than in previous eras. Without recapturing Scotland—and
none of the (English) Labour candidates for the party leadership offered immediate
ideas as to how this could be done, seemingly hoping mainly for Scots to tire of the
SNP—it is difficult to envisage a Labour majority government. Yet, it is Labour’s
desperate position in the south of England (London excepted) and abject failure
to make any gains in the Midlands in 2015 that provide its biggest problems.
Even if Labour had held all its Scottish seats, the party would have won only one
more seat than Neil Kinnock managed in 1992.12
The election aftermath provoked a measure of introspection and a considerable
amount of condemnation of the campaign within Labour ranks. Much of the criti-
cism was concentrated on the party’s inability to speak to the majority, instead
having focused on small disadvantaged minorities (e.g. the 2% of workers on zero-
hour contracts, many of whom indicate they are not dissatisfied with the arrange-
ment)13 and the lack of association with ‘aspiration’. As the former Home Secretary,
Alan Johnson, put it, Miliband, ‘talked about the squeezed middle but the middle
got squeezed out. There was a lot for the very poor and a lot about the very rich not
paying their whack but what about all those people in between?’14 A better leader
will broaden appeal and the reputation for economic competence might be
restored. A move to the centre, nonetheless, has its own risks. The electorate
might spot the existence of an avowedly fiscally responsible, low tax, aspirational,
socially liberal, pro-EU, pro-Union party. It is called the Conservative Party. The
current move to the Left, however, lacks electoral logic.
Even amid ideological and political incoherence, however, there are significant
opportunities for Labour to exploit. Amid the introspection and the ‘Must Labour
lose?’15 theses common after a run of election defeats, it is worth remembering that
12Philip Collins (2015, 22 May), ‘Labour’s strategy is unfathomably stupid’, The Times.
13http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-25098984, 26 November 2013.
14The Times (2015, 10 June) ‘Labour doomed from the start’.
15Such ideas date back many decades. See Abrams, M. and Rose, R. (1960) Must Labour Lose?
Harmondsworth, Penguin, for perhaps the most famous example.
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the Conservatives have only won one more election in the post-war era, the score
standing at 10-9. Before the next contest, the referendum on EU membership
may have produced significant intra-Conservative friction, which possibly might
not heal by 2020. Jostling for position to replace David Cameron as leader is
likely to exacerbate internal divisions. There was a significant UKIP 2015 vote
from electors who were politically engaged but nonetheless disillusioned. These
voters could conceivably return to Labour ranks after the EU referendum.
Labour might also interest at least sufficient of that one-third of electors who
abstained in 2015, in what Matt Flinders termed the ‘general rejection’ of politics
(although that will require far more than a gimmicky visit seeking Russell
Brand’s blessing, as undertaken by Ed Miliband). Blaming Labour after 2015 for
the economic difficulties of 2007–2010 will not be an adequate election strategy
for the Conservatives in 2020, by which time the agenda may be the quality of
public services, territory which helped shape the Labour victories of 1997, 2001
and 2005. Moderately regulated neo-liberalism, further cuts in services and rises
in, for example, university tuition fees, could wear the patience of the electorate.
In 2013, almost two-thirds of the electorate claimed not to have noticed reductions
in local council services, but this figure could rise.16 In 2015, the belief that the Con-
servatives could be relied upon more than Labour to generate economic growth was
not accompanied by much confidence over rises in living standards.
The Conservative victory in 2015 should not disguise the party’s continuing
structural problems. Swathes of the graduate middle-class (a growing portion
of society); black and ethnic minorities and much of northern England, site of
the largest public expenditure cuts in local government, eschew the party, while
Scotland has been barren territory for years. For all the modernisation of the
party’s image and outlook under Cameron, exemplified by his social liberalism
on same-sex marriage, the party’s elected representatives remain overwhelmingly
male and, at governmental level, usually the products of an elite private education
way beyond the means of most of the electorate they represent. Distaste for
Miliband’s Labour cannot be conflated with deep affection for the Conservatives.
Cameron was discomfited during the campaign when pressed on issues such as
zero-hour contracts, food banks and the living wage.17 That the Conservatives
could win an overall majority from a position where approximately two-thirds of
electors felt that they ‘care more about the rich than ordinary people’ and ‘are
16Accessed at https://www.ipsos-mori.com/researchpublications/researcharchive/3123/Public-concerned-
about-cuts-to-council-services-but-councils-arent-necessarily-to-blame.aspx, on 30 January 2013.
17See d’Ancona, M. ‘The Trials of David Cameron’, The Guardian, accessed at http://www.theguardian.
com/politics/2015/may/05/the-trials-of-david-cameron, on 5 May 2015.
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too close to big business and the banks’18 spoke volumes of Labour’s inadequacies,
but also highlights a continuing need for Conservative change.
Finally, in our second election volume, entitledLabour’s Second Landslide,19 so it
really does seem a long time ago, we, as editors, used our conclusion to question the
concentration upon opinion polls during the campaign, highlighting how they had
consistently over-estimated Labour’s vote share (even then). Opinion polling and
the wider market research industry provide valuable services, data and informa-
tion, but the conduct of pre-election polling does require close attention and is cur-
rently the subject of a review by the British Polling Council (BPC). The BPC review
will focus mainly on methodology and ask how the techniques informing the polls
could get the result so wrong. Our point is rather different and relates to the impact
of opinion polling on the representation of the election and the more substantive
content of debate about policy and leadership. In countries, such as France,
India, Italy and Spain, there is a brief period during which opinion polls are banned.
Not all contributors to this volume will share our concerns over pre-election
polling and its reporting, but, following the 2015 election, we revisit some of the
issues we raised in 2001. As Stephen Ward and Dominic Wring have highlighted,
much—too much, at nearly half of overall campaign broadcasting—election cover-
age is of the ‘horserace’, that is who is winning, at the expense of policy dissection.
That imbalance is not the pollsters’ fault, but it raises serious questions of the broad-
casters. Would they broadcast any other daily ‘news’ item about which they were
unsure of the veracity? Yet they did this nightly in respect of opinion polls which,
while far from worthless (they called it right in Scotland and offered clear indica-
tions of party leads on key issues and leadership), were incorrect in terms of the
‘big race’. An outright ban on opinion polls might justifiably be seen as illiberal
and, in an internet age, impractical. We oppose politicians trying to control
when and how survey questions are asked of electors, or determine how findings
are reported.20 However, the emphasis upon incorrect polls distorted the election
campaign. There ought to have been an inquiry into the reporting of the polls in
the 2015 campaign by the broadcasters, to match the inquiry into the seemingly
flawed polling methodology undertaken by the pollsters. Ultimately, the overarch-
ing contribution of the pre-election polls was merely to make more startling a
Conservative triumph, which, although far from inevitable, would otherwise
have been seen as a more likely prospect.
18Accessed at https://yougov.co.uk/news/2012/09/03/big-parties-big-problems/, on 3 September
2012.
19Geddes, A. and Tonge, J. (eds) (2002) Labour’s Second Landslide: the British General Election 2001,
Manchester, Manchester University Press.
20For these reasons, we regarded the post-election bill of Lord Foulkes, attempting to ban opinion polls,
as wrong. Our concern is with the coverage afforded to opinion polls.
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